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NOTES
FEDERAL COURTS, INJUNCTIONS, DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS, AND STATE LAW: THE SUPREME
COURT HAS FINALLY FASHIONED A WORKABLE
"ABSTENTION DOCTRINE"

T

JUDICIAL SYSTEM is founded on several policies which
act as guideposts for the courts. Among these is the policy that
states should be as free from federal control as possible.' At the opposite end of the spectrum is the view that federal courts have a duty to
protect individuals from violations of their constitutional rights.2 These
policies meet, and seemingly clash, when a plaintiff enters a federal
court either to request a declaratory judgment that a state statute is
unconstitutional or to seek an injunction against the enforcement of the
3
statute.
HE AMERICAN

This policy is reflected in The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), and The
Three-Judge Court Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). The Anti-Injunction Act provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
The Three-Judge Court Act provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or
execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in
the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any
district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such
statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court
of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
A three-judge court is required to hear requests for injunctions against the operation of
state laws because if such operation is to be enjoined, it should require the agreement of at
least two judges, rather than the decision of just a single judge. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970)
provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of a three-judge court as
an added safeguard for the states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or
permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
2 This position is evidenced b3 The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1970) and The
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). The Civil Rights Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an aetion at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal
taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
3 The plaintiff who enters a federal court to seek a declaratory judgment or an injunc-
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The balancing of these competing interests has caused the courts a
great amount of difficulty over the past ten years.4 In struggling to
harmonize the conflict, the courts have sometimes appeared to lean too
far towards states' rights; in other instances they have seemingly favored the rights of individuals. During the 1974 Term the Supreme
Court decided six cases 5 which in some way concerned either injunctions against the enforcement of unconstitutional state laws or declaratory judgments of their unconstitutionality. This note will show that a
workable doctrine has finally developed in this area as a result of the
guidance provided by these cases.
I.

PULLMAN AND THE PRE-SEXTET CASES

A.

Pullman Abstention

This note is not primarily concerned with the doctrine which originated in the 1941 case of Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 6 known
as "Pullman abstention." It is, however, concerned with the doctrine
expressed in Younger v. Harris,7 usually referred to as "Younger abstention," but more accurately termed "Younger nonintervention."" It is
nonetheless necessary to discuss "Pullman abstention" in order to avoid
some of the confusion which has plagued the courts, including the
tion against the enforcement of a state law will fall into one of two categories; either he
will have a prosecution pending against him under the challenged statute or he will not.
As will be seen, the category into which he falls will largely affect whether he receives the
requested relief.
4Actually the problem has a history much longer than ten years, see text accompanying notes 13-14 infra, but, for purposes of this discussion it is necessary to go back only as
far as Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
- Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975);
Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975); MTM, Inc. v.
Baxley, 420 U.S. 799 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975). This note will
discuss at length each of these opinions except Kugler.
6312 U.S. 496 (1941).
7401 U.S. 37 (1971).
8 It is important to realize that "Younger nonintervention," "Pullman abstention,"
and "Burford abstention" are distinct doctrines. "Younger" and "Pullman" are the two
most often used "abstention" doctrines, but it is also important to be aware of the "Burford
abstention" doctrine, which grew out of the case of Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943). Simply stated, Burford held that when a federal court is asked to entertain a
case dealing with an area in which the state has provided a specific form of review, thereby
allowing the state forum to obtain a particular expertise in the area, the federal court should
abstain. When a court invokes the "Younger doctrine," it does so to avoid intervening in an
ongoing state court proceeding. In "Pullman abstention" or "Burford abstention" on the
other hand, the issue is not whether the federal court should intervene in an ongoing state
action, but whether the federal court should decide a case about which it lacks sufficient
knowledge. In "Pullman abstention" the court lacks knowledge about the proper construction of the state law, see text accompanying notes 9-12 infra; in "Burford abstention"
it lacks the expertise which a special state body may have. For this reason, and because of
the confusion resulting from the indiscriminate use of the term "abstention" to refer to
distinct policies, "nonintervention" better describes the doctrine of Younger. For a much
more exhaustive discussion of Pullman and Burford abstention, and some of the confusion
involved in differentiating between them and Younger nonintervention, see Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 1071, 1153-87 (1974).
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United States Supreme Court, when they have dealt with "Younger nonintervention."
In sections of Texas where there was little passenger traffic, trains
carried only one sleeping car. Such trains, unlike those with more than
one sleeping car, were operated without a Pullman conductor, the sleeper
being in the charge of a porter. At that time all Pullman porters were
black and all Pullman conductors white. The Texas Railroad Commission
issued an order that all sleeping cars had to be in the continuous charge of
a Pullman conductor. The Pullman Company and the railroads affected
brought an action in federal court to enjoin the Commission's order on
two grounds. Pullman claimed first that the Commission was not authorized by Texas law to issue such an order and second, that the order violated the equal protection, due process, and commerce clauses of the
United States Constitution. A three-judge district court enjoined enforcement of the order9 and its decision was appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the
district court not to dismiss, but to retain jurisdiction over the federal
issues while plaintiffs brought an action in state court on the state
question.' 0 The Court's rationale for this action was twofold: It wished
to avoid reaching a federal constitutional issue if the case could be decided on an independent state question and it wanted to refrain from
deciding the state question. The Court pointed out that "the reign of
law" would not be furthered if a federal court provided an answer to a
state question, which answer would not have binding effect on the state's
courts."
Pullman abstention, then, arises when a federal court is asked to
decide a state question and a federal constitutional question, the state
question presents an independent state ground for decision, and the state
law is unclear. When a situation dictates Pullman abstention, the district court does not dismiss the federal complaint but abstains from deciding the federal issue, retains jurisdiction, and enables the plaintiff to
initiate an action in state court on the state question. If the state court
rules in favor of the plaintiff on his state question, the case is at an end; if
he loses on his state ground, the federal court then decides his federal
2
question.
Nonintervention, on the other hand, arises when a federal plaintiff
requests an injunction to restrain a pending state prosecution or requests
a declaratory judgment that a statute under which he is being prosecuted
is unconstitutional. Under the nonintervention doctrine, the federal
court dismisses the complaint and the plaintiff is forced to raise both his
federal and state issues in the pending state prosecution.
' Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 33 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Tex. 1940).
10Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1941).
" Id. at 500.
12 This is true at least in theory.
The unfortunate reality is that Pullman abstention
causes litigation to drag on for great lengths of time, sometimes never reaching a final
disposition. See Field, supra note 8, at 1085-86.
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Dombrowski and the Rebirth of Nonintervention

The doctrine of nonintervention did not appear for the first time in4
13
Dombrowski v. Pfister; rather, it has had a long and confusing history.'
In Dombrowski, the Court was aware of the doctrine of nonintervention
and to prevent its application found it necessary to overcome what was
viewed as its underlying policy:
[C]onsiderations of federalism have tempered the exercise of
equitable power, for the Court has recognized that federal interference with a State's good-faith administration of its criminal laws is peculiarly inconsistent with our federal frame15
work.
Plaintiffs in Dombrowski were the Southern Conference Educational
Fund, Inc. (SCEF) and James Dombrowski, the Executive Director of
SCEF. The defendants were a host of state legislative, prosecutorial,
and law enforcement officials including James Pfister, a Louisiana State
Representative and Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee on
Un-American Activities of the Louisiana Legislature. After the suit was
filed in district court, the Treasurer of SCEF and an attorney for SCEF
filed a petition of intervention which was granted.
The facts in Dombrowski are essential to a proper understanding
of nonintervention. The SCEF was a civil rights organization which
operated in Louisiana and other southern states for the purpose of fostering civil rights for black Americans. In October of 1963, Dombrowski
and the intervenors were arrested by Louisiana state and local police and
charged with violations of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law 16 and the Communist Propaganda Control Law. 7
In conjunction with these arrests their homes and offices were raided and
their files and records seized. These arrest warrants were quashed by
a state judge and the charges against Dombrowski and the intervenors
were dismissed. In subsequent proceedings, the state court suppressed
the evidence because the raid was illegal. After the dismissal, Louisiana
officials continued to threaten reinstitution of criminal prosecutions.
It was at this point, when no proceedings were pending against plaintiffs,
that they filed their action in district court alleging that the statutes
the state was attempting to enforce against them were unconstitutional
and that the threats to further enforce the statutes were made with no
expectation of securing convictions, but rather to discourage them from
carrying out constitutionally protected activities. Their complaint requested a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction to prevent
L3380 U.S. 479 (1965).
14 The doctrine's American roots can be traced to the 19th century case of in re Sawyer,
124 U.S. 200 (1888). It is not necessary for the purposes of this note to examine the doctrine's history. For an article which discusses this history at length, see B. Wechsler,
Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 740 (1974).
15380 U.S. at 484 (citation omitted).
16 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:358 to :374 (Cum. Supp. 1962), as amended, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14:358 to :373
17 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§

(1974).
14:390 to :390.8 (1974).
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defendants from enforcing the statutes in question against plaintiffs,
and to further prevent defendants from interfering with plaintiffs'
exercise of their constitutional rights.18
Since plaintiffs' complaint requested an injunction against the
enforcement of a statute with statewide applicability, it fell within the
Three-Judge Court Act.19 After the convening of the three-judge court,
prosecution officials summoned a grand jury in anticipation of indicting
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then applied to one of the three federal judges for
a temporary restraining order which was issued. Following the hearing,
however, the full three-judge district court dissolved the temporary
restraining order and dismissed the complaint. After the dismissal of
state grand jury returned indictments against
plaintiffs' complaint, the
20
plaintiffs.
the individual
The dismissal was appealed directly to the Supreme Court. As noted
above, Justice Brennan found that "considerations of federalism have
To support this
21
tempered the exercise of equitable power ....
22
which
statement, Mr. Justice Brennan cited the Anti-Injunction Act
the Court pointed out did not apply in Dombrowski because the grand
jury had not been convened until after the filing of the complaint in
state "proceedings" within the
federal district court. As a result no
23
meaning of section 2283 were pending.
Having established that section 2283 was not a bar to the requested
relief the Court proceeded to examine the net effect of the "considera-24
tions" that section 2283 typified. Citing Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
the Court made it clear that nonintervention had been applied when
plaintiffs would not suffer more harm by being forced to defend a state
criminal action than that "incidental to every criminal proceeding
brought lawfully and in good faith."2 5 Further, a federal court of
equity could not furnish greater protection for a plaintiff's constitutional
rights than would be afforded by pursuit of the state's appellate pro26
In
cesses, and if necessary, eventual appeal to the Supreme Court.
such a case, the Court found that a federal court should allow the state
criminal action to proceed undisturbed. The Court determined, however,
that Dombrowski was not such a case.
In making this determination the Court first looked to the statutes
involved and noted that state criminal prosecutions under statutes reguDombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. La. 1964) (three-judge court).
15For text of the Act, see note I supra.
20380 U.S. at 488.
21 Id. at 484. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
22 For text of the Act, see note 1 supra.
18

21380 U.S. at 484 n.2.
In Douglas a group of Jehovah's Witnesses convicted under
24 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
an ordinance of Jeannette, Pennsylvania of selling religious literature without paying a
city license tax sought injunctive relief from future prosecutions. Douglas is considered
the leading pre-Dombrowski case on nonintervention. The Court refused the requested
injunction, but at least partially on the ground that the ordinance had that same day
been declared unconstitutional in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
25 380 U.S. at 485, quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. at 164 (1943).
26 380 U.S. at 485.
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lating expression, particularly when the statutes are allegedly overbroad, can have a critical inhibiting effect on the exercise of first
amendment rights.27 The Court then proceeded to look at the facts of
the case: the reinstitution of criminal proceedings after they were once
quashed, repeated announcements that the SCEF was a subversive or
Communist-front organization, and threats to enforce statutory provisions
other than those under which indictments had already been brought.
On the basis of these observations, the Court concluded that the district court was incorrect in finding a lack of sufficient irreparable in28
jury to justify the federal court's intervention.
Thus, the Court considered two factors in deciding that the district
court should not have dismissed the case: the allegation that the statutes
violated the first amendment and the harassment surrounding the attempted enforcement. The combination of these two elements furnished
the irreparable injury which overcame the "considerations of federalism"
normally counselling a federal court to dismiss.
Having found that the district court should not have dismissed because of these "considerations," the Court was faced with a state statute
and no state court ruling that this statute applied to the SCEF. It was
a classic Pullman situation:
The District Court also erred in holding that it should abstain
pending authoritative interpretation of the statute in the state
courts, which might hold that they did not apply to SCEF, or
that they were unconstitutional as applied to SCEF. We hold the
abstention doctrine is inappropriate for cases such as the present one where, unlike Douglas v. City of Jeannette, statutes
are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected
29
activities.
The last sentence of this paragraph probably has been quoted more
than any other in the opinion. It is quoted, however, to support something for which it does not stand. It is quoted to show that a district
court should not dismiss, despite the policy considerations of nonintervention, when a statute is justifiably attacked on its face or when
30
there has been harassment on the part of the prosecutorial authority.
Yet this statement in Dombrowski actually stood for the proposition
that Pullman abstention rather than nonintervention should not be applied in either of these situations. This misconception regarding Dombrowski is not entirely the fault of the commentators; Mr. Justice Brennan caused much of the confusion by citing Douglas which was not a
27

Id. at 486.

2 Id. at 489.
29 Id. at 489-90.
30 See, e.g., Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 511 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S.
37 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 69-70 infra. See also Wechsler, supra note
14, at 837; The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 H~Av. L. REV. 56, 173 (1965).
But see
Spears, The Supreme Court February Sextet: Younger v. Harris Revisited, 26 BAYL R L.
REV. 1, 40-41 (1974).
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Pullman abstention case, but a nonintervention case. It is unclear why
Mr. Justice Brennan chose to cite Douglas. It is possible that he had
not clearly distinguished the two doctrines, though he did recognize
that they were different questions and that the test for overcoming Pullman abstention was less than that for overcoming nonintervention.
This was the status of nonintervention after Dombrowski. The Court
had declared that in the absence of sufficient irreparable harm a federal
court should not interfere with state criminal processes. Sufficient irreparable harm was found to be present when there was a combination of
a justifiable first amendment attack on a statute and harassment. A
number of commentators saw sufficient irreparable injury present when
there was either a justifiable first amendment attack on a statute or
harassment. If Dombrowski had established the rule declared by the
commentators, it would have been a serious erosion of states' rights.
The actual rule of Dombrowski demonstrated a respect for states' rights
but afforded relief to an individual plaintiff whose rights had been
abused by state officials.
C.

Zwickler v. Koota: Pullman Confused Again

The plaintiff in Zwickler v. Koota3t was arrested under Section
781-b of the New York Penal Laws which made it a crime to distribute
handbills containing statements about candidates for elected office, unless the name and address of the printer and the person for whom the
handbills were being distributed were printed on them. 32 He was con33
victed, but on appeal his conviction was reversed on state law grounds.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint in federal district court seeking
both a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional on its
face and an injunction against future prosecutions under the statute.
As will become apparent, this was not a case requiring the application
of nonintervention because the plaintiff did not attempt to enjoin a
pending state prosecution. The district court, however, failed to realize
this distinction and because of the requested injunction treated Zwickler as a nonintervention case. Referring solely to the requested injunction, and failing to find "special circumstances" which would overcome the considerations of federalism counselling nonintervention,
the district court dismissed the complaint. In its decision, the court so
confused nonintervention with Pullman abstention that it is impossible to
distinguish the two doctrines in the court's opinion. The court finally
dismissed the complaint stating that the plaintiff could bring an action
in state court for a declaratory judgment and thereby avoid waiting for
34
a criminal prosecution to test the constitutionality of the statute.
The district court's decision was appealed directly to the Supreme
31389 U.S. 241 (1967).
32 Id. at 242.
33 People v. Zwickler, (N.Y. App. T., April 23, 1965), cited at 389 U.S. at 243 n.2.
31 Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985, 993 (E.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court), rev'd, 389

U.S. 241 (1967). The district court had dismissed as in nonintervention but suggested that
plaintiff bring suit in. state court as in Pullman abstention.
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Court. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, viewed the case
as presenting dual issues:
We shall consider first whether abstention from the declaratory
judgment sought by appellant would have been appropriate in
the absence of his request for injunctive relief, and second, if
not, whether abstention was nevertheless justified because appellant also sought an injunction against future criminal prosecutions. . .. 35
In addressing the initial problem, Mr. Justice Brennan found that
absent the request for an injunction, it would have been error to abstain
from deciding the request for a declaratory judgment. Abstention was
not appropriate because the statute was attacked on the ground of
"overbreadth." It is important to note that the Court was here speaking about Pullman abstention. Mr. Justice Brennan stated that because
the statute was not vague, it would be futile to send the plaintiff to state
court where it would be impossible to render a decision which would
avoid the federal constitutional question. There was no doubt that this
36
statute applied to the plaintiff's proposed activities.
Mr. Justice Brennan next addressed the second question, "whether
abstention was nevertheless justified because appellant also sought an injunction against future criminal prosecutions."' 37 This is when the problem arose. When Mr. Justice Brennan here used the word "abstention"
he was no longer speaking of Pullman abstention, but rather of nonintervention. The question posited was whether the joining of a request
for an injunction with that for a declaratory judgment brought the request for declaratory judgment within the area where "considerations
of federalism have tempered the exercise of equitable power." 3 The
answer was a resounding no:
We hold that a federal district court has the duty to decide the
appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance
39
of the injunction.
In considering Zwickler v. Koota, what the courts did address is as
significant as what they failed to address. The district court did not address the request for a declaratory judgment; the Supreme Court did
not address the request for an injunction or raise the nonintervention
issue in connection with the request for a declaratory judgment. Stating that the appropriateness of the declaratory judgment and the injunction were different questions, the Court did not indicate whether
40
the district court was correct in deciding not to enjoin the prosecution.
389 U.S. at 245 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 249-50.
37 Id. at 245.
31 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
See text accompanying note 15
supra.
39389 U.S. at 254.
40 If the Supreme Court had affirmed the district court's refusal to grant an injunction,
35
31
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Cameron v. Johnson: Sloppiness Compounded

The Supreme Court next dealt with the distinction between abstention and nonintervention in Cameron v. Johnson.41 Actually, Cameron
had been before the Court earlier and it was at that point that its prob42
lems began.
Cameron, like Dombrowski, grew out of the civil rights movement
of the 1960's. On January 22, 1964, civil rights organizations held a
large demonstration at the Forrest County courthouse in Hattiesburg,
Mississippi. Every day afterwards, with the exception of Sundays,
they picketed the courthouse. On April 8, 1964, the Mississippi Legislature enacted, and the Governor signed, the Mississippi Anti-Picketing
Law. On April 9, the Forrest County sheriff read the new law to the
pickets and directed them to disperse, which they did. The next day,
however, picketers reappeared and were arrested; more arrests followed
as the picketing continued. On April 13, a class action was filed in
federal district court asking that the Anti-Picketing Law be declared
unconstitutional and that the state prosecutions be enjoined.4
The
district court dismissed the complaint, refusing to pass on the constitutionality of the statute, but finding no violation of44 plaintiffs' constitutional rights as a result of their arrests or prosecutions.
The district court's opinion was appealed directly to the Supreme
Court. In the interim, Dombrowski had been decided and thus the
Court in a per curiam decision vacated and remanded, instructing the
district court to first review the Anti-Injunction Act, and if found not to
bar the district court's deciding the case, then to consider the request in
light of Dombrowski.45 The dissent, however, found no reason to reverse the district court's opinion, and contended that although Dombrowski had approved injunctions against state proceedings to enforce a
statute facially violative of the first and fourteenth amendments, the decision turned on the allegation that the prosecutions had not been brought
in good faith. 48 Mr. Justice Black, writing for the dissent, further stated
that Dombrowski indicated that even when prosecuting officials were
acting under a statute not facially unconstitutional, they could be enjoined if the prosecutions were brought for the purpose of depriving
plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. 47 He concluded, however, that
Cameron involved no allegation of bad faith enforcement of the
it would have been answering the question of whether nonintervention applies to a requested injunction against future prosecutions, a question which is still open. See Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc. 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975), and text accompanying note 194 infra.
41 390

U.S. 611 (1968).

381 U.S. 741 (1965) (per curiam).
43 Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (three-judge court).
44 Id. at 849.
45 381 U.S. at 741-42. Mr. Justice Brennan who had written for the majority in Dombrowski and would do so again in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), and the second
Cameron decision, Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), joined in the per curiam decision, but Mr. Justice Black who would write the decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971), was among the four dissenters.
4 381 U.S. at 748-49 (Black, J., dissenting).
17Id. at 749.
42
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statute in question and thus there was no reason to intervene in the state
court proceeding.4"
On remand the district court again dismissed finding that the AntiInjunction Act prohibited the issuance of an injunction despite the argument that the Civil Rights Act was an exception to section 2283, and
declared the challenged statute to be constitutional.49 When Cameron
again reached the Supreme Court it was affirmed. In spite of the previous instruction to the district court to consider the Anti-Injunction
Act, the Court chose to avoid it. Mr. Justice Brennan stated that although the district court had found that the Civil Rights Act was not an
exception to section 2283's total bar to injunctions, and had on this
ground refused the requested injunctions of the prosecutions begun prior
it was unnecessary for the Supreme
to the filing of the federal suit,
50
Court to consider the question.
The Court proceeded to find that the statute was neither vague nor
overbroad, and thus not unconstitutional on its face. Although the Court
considered this question first and apart from the question of harassment, it did not state that a holding that the statute was unconstitutional would allow an injunction to issue. The Court then looked for
an "impermissible chilling effect" resulting from the manner in which
the statute had been enforced, and noted that "[w]e have not hesitated
on direct review to strike down applications of constitutional statutes
which we have found to be unconstitutionally applied to suppress protected freedoms." 51 The Court did not find that the statute in question
had been unconstitutionally applied and accordingly affirmed the district
court's decision.
The dissent pointed very clearly to the problem caused by the double
use of the term "abstention" in Dombrowski:
I agree that the statute in question is not "unconstitutional on its
face." But that conclusion is not the end of the matter. Dombrowski stands for the proposition that "the abstention doctrine
is inappropriate for cases . . . where . . . statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or
as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activi52
ties."

41

Id.

19262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1966) (three-judge court).
50390 U.S. at 613-14 n.3.
51Id. at 620. Mr. Justice Brennan merely reiterated what Mr. Justice Black had stated
in his dissent to the remand of Cameron:
[T]here might be cases in which state or federal oflicers, acting under color of a
law which is valid, could be enjoined from engaging in lawful conduct which deprives persons of their federally guaranteed statutory or constitutional rights.
381 U.S. at 749 (Black, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Black read Dombrowski as allowing an
injunction in the absence of an unconstitutional statute but in the presence of harassment.
Mr. Justice Brennan argued by analogy based on what the Court would do on direct re-

view.
52390 U.S. at 622 (Fortas, J., dissenting), quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
489-90 (emphasis added by Mr. Justice Fortas).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss1/6
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The proposition for which the dissenters quoted Dombrowski is not
untrue. In fact the majority, after having decided that the statute was
constitutional, looked for harassment in the enforcement of the statute
The problem is that
with an eye toward enjoining the prosecution.5
when this passage, which actually referred to Pullman abstention, 54 is
cited for the proposition that harassment alone will overcome the "considerations of federalism" against issuing an injunction, it leads to the
untrue conclusion that a facially unconstitutional statute alone will do
the same.
E.

Golden v. Zwickler: Anonymous Campaign Literature Revisited

The Supreme Court had one more opportunity to shape this area of
the law before nonintervention acquired its given name in Younger v.
Harris.5 In Zwickler v. Koota,56 the Supreme Court had instructed
the district court on remand to consider the request for declaratory judgment separately from the request for an injunction. As previously discussed, plaintiff in Zwickler had been prosecuted once under section
781-b of the Penal Law of New York State, but his conviction had been
reversed by a state appellate court on state grounds. Thereafter he went
into district court seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction,
but the court dismissed his complaint. 57 On remand the district court
had to first determine if plaintiff presented a justiciable controversy as
required by the Declaratory Judgment Act.58 It found unconvincing
defendant's argument that the case was moot because it was unlikely
that the Congressman attacked by the handbills would again run for
Congress. There had been an active controversy at the time the federal
case had begun and there was no reason to doubt plaintiff's allegation
that the challenged statute currently was deterring him from the full
59
exercise of his first amendment rights.
The district court went on to declare the statute unconstitutional. In
its first opinion the district court had dwelt on the impropriety of the
requested injunction without mentioning the requested declaratory judgment. In its second opinion the court gave primary consideration to the
requested declaratory judgment, referring to the requested injunction
only to implement its declaratory judgment of the statute's unconstitutionality and without considering the nonintervention issue.60
The Supreme Court again reversed the opinion of the district court,
and in so doing revealed the essential problem facing a plaintiff, against
54

U.S. at 618-20.
See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.

55

401 U.S. 37 (1971).

5-390

389 U.S. 241 (1967).
See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
Actually, the requirement is imposed on the
5' See note 2 supra for text of the Act.
courts by the Constitution and the Act merely codifies the requirement.
5' Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (three-judge court).
60290 F. Supp. at 258. This is an excellent example of the two-step process of avoiding the nonintervention doctrine which the Court would seek to guard against in Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). See text accompanying note 87 infra.
56
-7
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whom no prosecution is pending, who challenges the constitutionality of
a state statute:
We think that under all the circumstances of the case the fact
that it was most unlikely that the Congressman would again be
a candidate for Congress precluded a finding that there was
"sufficient immediacy and reality" here ....
His assertion in his
brief that the former Congressman can be "a candidate for Congress again" is hardly a substitute for evidence that this is a
prospect of "immediacy and reality." 6'
The Supreme Court, by reversing on the issue of justiciability, never
reached the question of the correctness of the issuance of an injunction
and thus avoided determining the applicability of nonintervention when
plaintiff was not being prosecuted under the attacked statute. This was
62
the condition of the law prior to the February Sextet.
II.
A.

THE FEBRUARY SEXTET

The "Landmark Case" of Younger v. Harris

Younger v. Harris63 has been assessed in these terms:
In a disastrous defeat for the first amendment, a two-pronged
Dombrowski became one-pronged if state criminal proceedings
64
were pending at the time of the filing of the federal court suit.
This statement is incorrect. Besides being incorrect in its implication
that Dombrowski had set up a "two-pronged test," the satisfaction of
either prong requiring the issuance of an injunction, it contains a negative pregnant that Dombrowski's "two-pronged test" still stood when
no state criminal proceedings were pending at the time of the filing of
the federal court suit. Dombrowski never constructed such a test.
There were four plaintiffs in Younger v. Harris and their situations
illuminate both aspects of the constitutional challenge to state statutes
here under consideration: those when the plaintiff is currently being
prosecuted and those when he is not. After being indicted for distributing certain leaflets in violation of California's Criminal Syndicalism
Act, 65 plaintiff Harris sought dismissal of the indictment in California
Superior Court based on the Act's alleged unconstitutionality. When
this request was denied, he petitioned for writs of prohibition in the
California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. These
61 Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103,
109 (1969). By this time Koota, the named defendant when the action began, was no longer district attorney, having been replaced by
the present named defendant, Golden.
62 The February Sextet is the name commonly given to Younger v. Harris and its
companion cases: Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200
(1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

3 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
64 Wechsler, supra note

14, at 867.

65 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-02 (West 1972).
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petitions also denied, he next turned to the federal district court to seek
an injunction. The other three plaintiffs, on the other hand, had not been
indicted. Plaintiffs Dan and Hirsch, members of the Progressive Labor
Party, alleged that the presence of the Act "on the books" and the
prosecution pending against Harris inhibited them in the advocation of
the program of their political party. Plaintiff Broslawsky, a history professor, alleged uncertainty as to whether his practice of teaching about
Communist Manifesto might subject him
the doctrines of Marx and the
6
to prosecution under the Act.1
The district court began by indicating that it would have been better
if the state court had first considered the constitutionality of the state
statute.67 The court stated that under normal circumstances the unconstitutionality of the Act would be raised only as a defense in the
criminal case but, citing Dombrowski, that, "in recent years, exceptions
to this rule have been applied."68 The district court then quoted extensively from Dombrowski, closing with:
The opinion [in Dombrowski] then went on to state the rule that
"We hold the abstention doctrine is inappropriate for cases
such as the present one where . . . statutes are justifiably
attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or as applied
for the purpose of discouraging protected activities."6 9
The district court said that based on Dombrowski, if the challenged
statute was an unconstitutional restriction on free expression, as they
believed it was, the state prosecution should be enjoined. 70 The court
had fallen into Mr. Justice Brennan's trap for the unwary. It went on
to find that Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky also presented a justiciable
controversy not because prosecutions were dangerously near or there
was any likelihood that California courts would entertain such prosecutions but because "[w]ell-intentioned prosecutors and judicial safeguards do not neutralize the vice of a vague law."'" Accordingly, the
Act was declared unconstitutional and its enforcement enjoined.
Mr. Justice Black had been waiting for an opportunity to clarify
72
Dombrowski since his dissent to the remand of Cameron v. Johnson.
The opportunity presented itself in Younger and he seized it; unfortunately, his clarification was not thorough. Mr. Justice Black first
addressed the three unindicted plaintiffs saying that they did not present
a genuine controversy. They had not alleged, and the district court did
not find, that they would be prosecuted under the challenged statute.
Instead they had alleged only that they felt inhibited. Mr. Justice Black
Il Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 509 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (three-judge court).
17Id. at 510.
Id.
Id. at 511, quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965)
omitted).
70 281 F. Supp. at 511.
71 Id. at 516-17, quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964).
72 381 U.S. 741 (1965) (per curiam). See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
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made it clear that such an allegation, even if true, was not sufficient to
allow the federal court to issue the requested injunction. 73 The clear
implication of this statement was that these three plaintiffs also could
not challenge the statute by way of an action for declaratory judgment.
Having disposed of plaintiffs Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky, Mr.
Justice Black proceeded to the larger task at hand, the clarification of
Dombrowski. He began with the history of the doctrine of nonintervention and concluded:
In all these cases the Court stressed the importance of showing
irreparable injury, the traditional prerequisite to obtaining an
injunction. In addition, however, the Court also made clear that
in view of the fundamental policy against federal interference
injury is inwith state criminal prosecutions, even irreparable
' 74
sufficient unless it is "both great and immediate."
According to Mr. Justice Black, the rationale for the additional requirement that the irreparable harm be both great and immediate was twofold: the tradition that a court of equity should not interfere with a criminal prosecution, and more importantly, "comity," a term used to express
the concept of having a proper respect for the functions of the states.
for these reasons very relucPrior to Dombrowski, federal courts were 75
tant to enjoin the state criminal prosecutions.
Mr. Justice Black next acknowledged the district court's belief that
Dombrowski had eased the requirements for obtaining an injunction
against state criminal prosecutions:
We recognize that there are some statements in the Dombrowski
opinion that would seem to support this argument. But, as we
have already seen, such statements were unnecessary for the
decision of that case, because the Court found that the plaintiffs
had alleged a basis for equitable relief under the long-established
76
standards.
The basis to which Mr. Justice Black referred was the combination of a
facially void statute and the harassment by state officials in bringing a
prosecution without hope of success, and thereby presenting great and
immediate irreparable harm. But what of the language which was un73The Court stated:

If these three had alleged that they would be prosecuted for the conduct they
planned to engage in, and if the District Court had found this allegation to be true either on the admission of the State's district attorney or on any other evidence then a genuine controversy might be said to exist. But here appellees Dan, Hirsch,
and Broslawsky do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution,
that a prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible. They
claim the right to bring this suit solely because, in the language of their complaint,
they "feel inhibited." We do not think this allegation, even if true, is sufficient
to bring the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts into play to enjoin a pending
state prosecution.
401 U.S. at 42.
74 Id. at 46.
75Id. at 43-44.
76 Id. at 50.
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necessary to the decision in Dombrowski? Although Mr. Justice Black
avoided quoting the language, it is clear that he was referring to Mr.
Justice Brennan's oft-quoted trap that abstention was inappropriate
where a statute is attacked for violating the first amendment on its face
or as applied.

77

Mr. Justice Black was correct in his belief that this language was
unnecessary for the Court's decision on the nonintervention issue, but
he was incorrect in his statement that this language was unnecessary
for the decision in Dombrowski.71 If the Court had not used this language to dispose of the issue of Pullman abstention, it could not have
instructed the district court to issue the requested injunction. Rather,
it would have been forced to instruct the district court to "abstain" while
plaintiffs went into state court to obtain a declaratory judgment
re79
garding the applicability of the challenged statutes to their activities.
Although this might seem like a distinction without a difference, it
is essential to realize that Dombrowski set up a test which required a
showing of great and immediate irreparable harm consisting of both
the presence of a facially void statute and harassment on the part of
state officials, and that this test did not develop as a result of Younger
working a change on Dombrowski. 0 Another important point set forth
in Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Younger, is that all six
nonintervention cases decided that day dealt only with criminal prosecutions pending in state court when the request for an injunction was
made. The Court left undecided the issue of how a requested injunction or declaratory judgment should be treated when such requests
looked only to future state prosecutions.8 ' These statements by Mr.
77See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
71Mr. Justice Black apparently felt this language was dictum; it was not.

7'See text accompanying notes 6-12 supra.
80 Although Dombrowski's test was satisfied by the presence of both a facially void
statute and harassment, it is clear that harassment alone would have supplied the immediate irreparable harm required for a federal court to intervene. This was the import of
Mr. Justice Brennan's statement:
We have not hesitated on direct review to strike down applications of constitutional
statutes which we have found to be unconstitutionally applied to suppress protected freedoms.
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 620 (1968). See text accompanying note 47 supra.
It is important to recall that a facially void statute alone is not enough to satisfy the
Dombrowski test. Mr. Justice Black did, however, slightly open the door to this possibility
in Younger:
There may, of course, be extra-ordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad
faith and harassment .... "Itis of course conceivable that a statute might be
flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever
an effort might be made to apply it."
401 U.S. at 53-54, quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941). It must be remembered that this statement opened the door to a possibility not addressed in Dombrowski, and did not close it to one which was addressed as some commentators believe.
See text accompanying note 64 supra. In fact, it can be questioned whether this opened
the door at all. If the hypothetical "flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional statute were
ever to exist, it seems very probable that any attempt to enforce it would necessarily involve "bad faith and harassment."
81 401 U.S. at 54-55 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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Justice Stewart are of utmost interest vhen it is recalled that in Dombrowski the Court specifically pointed out that there was no criminal
prosecution pending at the time the federal complaint was filed, at
least for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. If Dombrowski was a
case in which there was no pending state prosecution, and if, as the

majority of the Younger Court stated, Dombrowski required both great
and immediate irreparable harm for the issuance of an injunction, it
follows logically that the question Mr. Justice Stewart considered still
open had in fact been answered by Dombrowski. In the absence of a
pending criminal prosecution, great and immediate irreparable harm
would be required for the issuance of an injunction. Such harm would
be present if a statute, whether or not constitutional on its face, were
applied in a manner that denied plaintiff his constitutionally guaranteed
rights.5 2
B.

Samuels v. Mackell: DeclaratoryJudgments,
Pending Prosecutions,and Nonintervention

The facts in Samuels v. Mackell"3 bear a striking similarity to those
of its fellow Sextet member, Younger. Plaintiffs in Samuels were under
indictment for violation of four sections of the New York Penal Law 4
when they filed their complaint in federal district court seeking both
declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed on the
ground that the attacked statutes were constitutional.8 5 The Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal, but not on the same ground.
Mr. Justice Black, based on his decision in Younger, first said that
it was error for the district court to consider the request for an injunction
in the absence of great and immediate irreparable injury. He then
considered the request for a declaratory judgment and held that the same
principles, with one clarification, applied whether a state criminal defendant requested a declaratory judgment or an injunction. This result
was necessary for at least two reasons. First, the Declaratory Judgment Act specifically states that after a federal court has issued a
declaratory judgment, it may enforce that declaration by granting additional necessary relief.8 6 As a result, a declaratory judgment granted
while a state prosecution is pending might later be used by a federal
plaintiff to obtain an injunction to enforce the declaratory relief. This
would have the unpleasant effect of allowing a plaintiff, using a twostep method, to accomplish what nonintervention sought to prevent.
Second, even if a plaintiff did not use the declaratory judgment to obtain
an injunction, it would be highly unlikely that in the face of a federal
12 Although, as the Court pointed out, there was no prosecution pending for purposes of

§ 2283, it is possible that there was a prosecution pending for nonintervention purposes.
380 U.S. at 484 n.2. See text accompanying notes 174-80 infra. This would explain
Mr. Justice Stewart's quoted statenent, even though, he does not seem to realize it in the
most recent cases. See text accompanying note 174 infra.
S3 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
14 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 160, 161, 163, 580(i) (McKinney 1967).
See 401 U.S. at 67.
15 Samuels v. Mackell, 288 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (three-judge court).
s16401 U.S. at 72.
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of unconstitutionality the state would continue its
court's declaration
87
prosecution.
The one clarification made by Mr. Justice Black was that when the
required great and immediate irreparable harm was found, the court
might simply find it more appropriate to grant the declaratory judgment and deny the injunction because declaratory relief is less intrusive
than injunctive relief. 8 Mr. Justice Black's observation on this aspect
of the declaratory remedy would later be applied to the parallel situation
of a constitutional challenge to a state statute absent a pending prosecution. s 9
C.

Perez v. Ledesma: Mr. Justice Brennan and the Sextet

Plaintiffs in Perez v. Ledesma90 operated a newsstand in the Parish
of St. Bernard, Louisiana, which sold allegedly obscene materials. As
a result, informations were filed against plaintiffs in a state court under
a Louisiana statute 9' and a St. Bernard Parish ordinance. 92 After the
filing of the informations, plaintiffs entered federal court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the statute and ordinance were unconstitutional and an injunction against the pending prosecutions. Though the
statute was found constitutional, the court held that, lacking a prior
adversary hearing, the seizure, and consequently the arrests, were invalid. 3 The court further expressed the view that the challenged parish
ordinance was unconstitutional, but because it was not a law of statewide application, they were without power under the Three-Judge Court
Act to declare it unconstitutional.9 4 On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that the district court erred in declaring the arrests and seizure of materials invalid, and in issuing a suppression order that effectively hindered
the good faith criminal prosecution. Based on Younger, the Court9 5found
the district court's interference with the state prosecution improper.
The majority of the Court found that they were unable to review the
district court's statement on the invalidity of the parish ordinance because it was not the final judgment of a three-judge court, reviewable
directly by the Supreme Court.9 6 Mr. Justice Brennan, on the other
hand, found the three-judge court's mere expression of opinion on the
parish ordinance to be a reviewable judgment and proceeded to do so in
97
a separate opinion.
87 Id.

ss Id. at 73.
"' See text accompanying note 129 infra.
90 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
" LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106 (Supp. 1970).

92 401 U.S. at 83.
91 Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662, 667-69 (E.D. La. 1969)
(three-judge court).
14 Id. at 670.
95 401 U.S. at 83-85.
96 Id. at 86.
97 Id. at 98-99 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Mr. justice Brennan's review of the parish ordinance opinion enabled
him to explore issues which the rest of the Court did not reach. At the
time of the filing of the federal complaint, prosecutions were pending
under the challenged ordinance, but before the three-judge court convened to hear the case, the prosecution had entered a nolle prosequi in
the state court. Mr. Justice Brennan found that the district court was,
therefore, correct in not considering nonintervention as far as the
ordinance was concerned. He found that the availability of the requested
relief depended upon the situation at the time of the hearing in district
court, not at the time the complaint was filed.9
Having established that he was dealing with a situation in which no
prosecution was pending, Mr. Justice Brennan turned to his earlier decision in Dombrowski, stating that, where no prosecution is pending, it
recognized two situations when nonintervention should not be applied.
He listed these as harassment and "where a criminal statute prohibits
or seems to prohibit constitutionally protected conduct, and to that
extent is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad ... "99
It seems strange that Mr. Justice Brennan made this statement in
Perez. In his concurring opinion to Younger he had not stated that
Dombrowski set forth two situations when nonintervention should not
apply. The majority in Younger had determined that Dombrowski did
not set forth two situations calling for intervention. Even stranger is
what followed shortly after this statement in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Perez:
However, where federal intervention is sought after a state
prosecution has commenced and while it is pending, the interests protected by federal intervention must be weighed
against the broad countervailing principles of federalism.
... For these reasons, federal courts should not ordinarily
intervene by way of either declaratory or injunctive relief in
cases where a state court prosecution exists that began before
the federal suit was filed, and the federal court plaintiff alleges
only that a state statute being applied to him is unconstitutional.100
This weighing is exactly what Mr. Justice Brennan had done in Dombrowski. Mr. Justice Brennan seems to be saying that Dombrowski
stood for two propositions: on the one hand, that great and immediate
irreparable harm was found in Dombrowski because of the combination
of a facially void statute and harassment; on the other, that Dombrowski would allow the issuance of an injunction, in the absence of a
state prosecution, upon either a facially void statute or harassment. In
view of the Court's Younger decision, and the above discussion of Dombrowski,' the only conclusion that can be reached is that Mr. Justice
98Id. at

103-04.

99 Id. at 117-18.

100 Id. at 120-21.
101See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
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Brennan was wrong in his statement that Dombrowski had recognized
two situations calling for a federal court's intervention.
There is yet another aspect of Justice Brennan's opinion worth noting.
In Golden v. Zwickler, 10 2 the Court found that plaintiff, who was not
being prosecuted, had not presented a justiciable controversy concerning
the alleged unconstitutionality of the challenged statute. Mr. Justice
Brennan found no such problem in Perez. Plaintiffs had alleged that
they wished to continue selling the items which had led to their arrests
and because the state had once begun prosecutions under the challenged
ordinance it was highly likely that it would do so again. So here,
unlike Golden, the challenge to the ordinance was presented in the form
of a real controversy between parties having adverse interests.l u°

III.
A.

AMPLIFICATION OF THE SEXTET

Mitchum v. Foster: "A Decision of the First Magnitude,"'1 4
Without Any Meaning

It will be recalled that in Dombrowski the Court referred to the AntiInjunction Act to evidence the concerns for federalism which form the
basis for nonintervention. The Court, however, stated that the Act did
not apply to that particular case because, at the time the federal complaint was filed, "no state 'proceedings' were pending within the intendment of § 2283. ' ' 105 In Cameron v. Johnson,10 6 section 2283 was
likewise avoided by the Court because the considerations typified by
the section rendered an injunction improper regardless of whether the
Act itself was a bar. 0 7 Again in the Sextet, the Court relied solely on
the equitable principles which counsel nonintervention to deny the
relief requested, and thus avoided the issue of whether an injunction
must be denied because of section 2283 even when immediate irreparable
harm is present."'8 Finally, in Mitchum v. Foster,1°9 the Court addressed the question of whether, in a case filed under the Civil Rights
Act, section 2283 would be a bar to the relief requested.
Plaintiff in Mitchum operated a bookstore in Bay County against
which a proceeding to close as a public nuisance had been brought by
394 U.S. 103 (1969).
Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
Appellees' complaint expressly alleges, and there was no evidence or finding to
the contrary, that appellees "desire to continue to keep for sale and to sell" the
publications and playing cards in question. Thus, unlike the situation in Golden,
the question of the constitutionality of the ordinance is "presented in the context of
a specific live grievance".
Indeed, in light of the appellants' aggressive prosecution of appellees, the inference is permissible that any attempts by appellees to
continue to display the questioned publications for sale might well again be met
with prosecutions under both the statute and ordinance.
401 U.S. at 102 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
104Wechsler, supra note 14, at 877-78.
105 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
See text accompanying note 23 supra.
106 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
'0

103

107Id. at 613 n.3.

108
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
10 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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the county prosecutor. While the proceedings were pending in state
court plaintiff filed a civil rights action in federal district court seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief from the pending state court action.
The facts seem to be much like those in Younger, but with one exception. In Younger and its companion cases, the federal plaintiff was
being prosecuted in a state criminal action. Plaintiff in Mitchum was not
involved in a criminal action; rather, the pending state court case was of a
type which the Supreme Court later referred to as -akin to a criminal
prosecution."' 10 It was a civil action under state law in aid of the state's
criminal law.
The three-judge court refused to enjoin the state action based on the
Anti-Injunction Act, stating that the Civil Rights Act was not an exception to section 2283's total bar to injunctions.''' An appeal was taken
directly to the Supreme Court where Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the
opinion for a unanimous Court.
The Court was faced with a dilemma. It had previously avoided the
question of whether the Civil Rights Act was an exception to the AntiInjunction Act by relying solely on nonintervention principles. It could
have done so again because plaintiff in Mitchum had failed to allege the
requisite harassment to overcome the nonintervention doctrine. This,
however, would have meant deciding that nonintervention applied to
"quasi-criminal" as well as criminal cases. Unwilling to take such a
step, the Court finally reached the question of whether the Civil Rights
Act was an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. The answer was
affirmative.
In arriving at this decision Mr. Justice Stewart reviewed the history
of both Acts and determined that Congress clearly intended the Civil
Rights Act to be an exception to section 2283's total bar to injunctions.
This determination was based on the concern of Congress that individuals be free from unconstitutional state action even when that action
was on the part of a state court. Mr. Justice Stewart, however, )ointed
out that the Court had avoided the question of nonintervention and that
the Court's decision was not to be viewed as questioning the principles
upon which nonintervention is based."12 Mr. Chief Justice Burger, in a
concurring opinion, stressed that the question of the applicability of nonintervention in civil cases was still open." 3
What, then, is the meaning of Mitchum? The Anti-Injunction Act is
not a bar to the issuance of an injunction under the Civil Rights Act
against a pending state court action; if, however, that state court action is
a criminal action there must be present great and immediate irreparable
harm. Thus Mitchum's real vitality is only in the civil area. As will be seen,
this vitality has recently been considerably restricted." 4
"o Huffnman v.

131-44

Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).

See text accompanying notes

infra.
. Mitchum v. Foster, 315 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Fla. 1970).

11Z
407 U.S. at 243.
'" Id. at 244 (Burger,

C. J., concurring).
114See text accompanying notes 131-44 infra.
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B.

Steffel v. Thompson: Nonintervention in the Absence
of a Pending State Action

In Steffel v. Thompson' 5 the Supreme Court reached one of the questions left open by the Sextet: In the absence of a pending state court
action, what are the standards for granting a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of a state criminal statute?
Plaintiff in Steffel participated in protests against the United States'
involvement in Vietnam, a part of which included the distribution of handbills at a shopping center in Georgia. Employees of the shopping center
requested that plaintiff and his companions stop their activities, but they
refused. The employees summoned police officers who told plaintiff and
his companions to leave or be arrested; they left but returned two days
later. Police were again summoned and plaintiff again stopped handbilling, but one of his companions refused and was arrested. Plaintiff thereupon filed an action in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the handbilling statute" 6 was unconstitutional as applied to
him and an injunction against its enforcement. The district court dismissed on the ground that "no meaningful contention can be made that
the state has or will in the future act in bad faith."' 7 The plaintiff appealed from the district court's opinion, but only on the question of the
declaratory judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment refusing declaratory relief."18 The plaintiff
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, first had to confront
the problem which had doomed three of the four plaintiffs in Younger:
Was there a justiciable controversy? He held that, based on the warnings
of the police and the arrest of plaintiff's companion, Steffel had presented
a "case or controversy" within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment
Act at the time his federal complaint had been filed. That, however, did
not end the problem. In Golden v. Zwickler,"19 the Court had found that
plaintiff did not present a justiciable controversy because the Congressman his anonymous handbills attacked was unlikely to run again for
Congress. Steffel encountered the same type of problem. By the time
the Supreme Court heard his case the United States' involvement in
Vietnam had changed. Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that it was
possible that the plaintiff was no longer so strenuously opposed to the
country's involvement in Vietnam, and as a result no longer wished to
distribute handbills at the shopping center in question. 20 The Court
11

415 U.S. 452 (1974).
§ 26-1503 (1972).

116 GA. CODE ANN.

Becker v. Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386, 1389 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972).
See text accompanying note 61 supra.
", 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
...The Court seemed to demand a great amount of specificity concerning the exact
nature of the controversy:
Since we cannot ignore the recent developments reducing the Nation's involvement
in that part of the world, it will be for the District Court on remand to determine if
subsequent events have so altered petitioner's desire to engage in handbilling at the
shopping center that it can no longer be said that this case presents "a substan"1
11
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said that it was for the district 2court to decide on remand whether a justiciable controversy still existed.' '
Despite the possible lack of justiciability, Mr. Justice Brennan addressed
the question of the appropriate action for a district court asked to declare
a statute unconstitutional in the absence of a state prosecution. Quoting from his separate opinion in Perez22 he concluded:
[Wlhen no state prosecution is pending and the only question
is whether declaratory relief is appropriate[,] . . . the Congres-

sional scheme that makes the federal courts the primary
guardians of constitutional rights, and the express congressional
authorization of declaratory relief, afforded because it is a less
harsh and abrasive remedy than the injunction, become the
23
factors of primary significance.

1

The Court's opinion made it clear that in the absence of a state prosecution, if a plaintiff presents a justiciable controversy, a declaratory judgment should be issued. This is true whether the statute is attacked on its
face or, as in Steffel, as applied. In the absence of an actual pending
prosecution the balance is struck differently than in the presence of one.
When the plaintiff has not actually disobeyed the statute and wishes a
declaration of his rights and liabilities before doing so, the policy of the
Declaratory Judgment Act that a person should not have to "eat the suspect to find out whether it is a mushroom or a toadstool"'2

4

controls.

The Court was careful to point out that it was not deciding what
course should be followed in the absence of a pending state action if the
requested relief were an injunction, the other question left open by
Younger.12- Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, stated with
regard to justiciability that although the present plaintiff had been successful in presenting a genuine controversy, at least at the inception of
the federal action, it was unlikely that many plaintiffs would be able to do
so. 12
As Mr. Justice Stewart noted, the chief problem facing a federal
tial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment."
415 U.S. at 460. From the Court's discussion of the possible lack of a controversy in
Steffel, it appears that to have presented a justiciable controversy the plaintiff would not only
have had to allege a continuing desire to distribute handbills, but a continuing desire to
distribute the same handbills at the same shopping center.
121

Id.

122 Perez

v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 104 (1971) (Brennan, J., separate opinion). See
text accompanying notes 90-103 supra.
123 415 U.S. at 463.
124 Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L.J. 445,
469 (1943).
125415 U.S. at 475.
126415 U.S. at 476 (Stewart, J., concurring), wherein he stated:
The petitioner in this case has succeeded in objectively showing that the threat of
imminent arrest, corroborated by the actual arrest of his companion, has created an
actual concrete controversy between himself and the agents of the State. He has,
therefore, demonstrated "a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state
criminal statute ..
" Cases where such a "genuine threat" can be demonstrated
will, I think, be exceedingly rare.
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plaintiff in the absence of a state prosecution is not nonintervention, but
the lack of justiciability. Steffel demonstrated one way to establish justiciability - an oral threat of enforcement. Before proceeding to the 1974
Term cases, it will be helpful to look at two cases decided before Steffel
on the question of justiciability of a claim for declaratory relief.
C.

Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton:
Abortions and Nonintervention

Roe v. Wade 2 7 and its companion case Doe v. Bolton2 8 are the landmark Supreme Court cases on abortion. They are pertinent here not for
their final holdings, but for their holdings on justiciable controversies.
In Roe v. Wade there were three plaintiffs: Roe, a single woman,
pregnant at the time the suit began; Hallford, a physician with two state
prosecutions pending against him for performing abortions; and the Does,
a childless married couple who feared a future unwanted pregnancy
which might impair the mother's health. The district court dismissed the
Does, finding a lack of justiciability. It granted declaratory relief to Roe
and Hallford, but refused injunctive relief. Plaintiffs appealed the denial
of injunctive relief directly to the Supreme Court and defendants crossappealed the grant of declaratory relief.
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Blackmun, the Court held that the district
court was correct in finding that Roe presented a justiciable controversy
even though she was no longer pregnant at the time the Court heard the
case. It is of greater significance, however, that the Court found standing on the part of Roe to challenge a state criminal statute under which
she could not be prosecuted. Her constitutional rights were not infringed
by the possibility that the statute could be used in a prosecution against
her, but rather by the fact that she was refused an abortion because of
her physician's fear of prosecution. This aspect of Roe enlarges Steffel
to allow a declaratory judgment to issue to a plaintiff whose denial of
constitutional rights is not a result of the statute directly working against
the plaintiff, but of the statute working against another to deny plaintiff's
constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision as to Hallford
on Younger principles, and affirmed as to the Does because their fear of a
future pregnancy was far too speculative to establish a present "'case or
controversy." In affirming the declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality, the Court did not decide the issue of the requested injunction but
stated that since the prosecutors would probably not attempt to enforce
the statutes after they had been declared unconstitutional, an injunction
2 9
was not required.1
Doe v. Bolton was similar to Roe except that in Doe the Supreme Court
127

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

'8 410 U.S. 179 (1973).

U.S. at 166. The Court there stated:
We find it unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred in withholding
injunctive relief, for we assume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full
credence to this decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State are
unconstitutional.

129410
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also found that nine unindicted physicians presented a justiciable controversy. Plaintiffs, besides Doe, were nurses, clergymen, social workers,
corporations, and physicians. The Court stated that since Doe was recognized for the purpose of challenging the Georgia abortion statutes,
whether the other plaintiffs would be recognized as presenting a justiciable controversy was not a question of great import. The Court did
state, however, that the nine physicians would be recognized as plaintiffs,
even though they had never been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the challenged statutes.-1 0
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton then, although decided before Steffel,
amplified its holding. In the absence of a pending state criminal prosecution, a federal court should grant declaratory relief when a prosecution
is actually threatened against the plaintiff under the challenged statute,
when it is fairly certain that if the plaintiff engages in the proscribed activities he will be prosecuted, or when the statute works against another
individual in a way that denies the plaintiff constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
This was the state of the law on the eve of the Supreme Court's 1974
Term. In Younger, the Court had reaffirmed the Dombrowski rule that
when a state prosecution is pending, a proper respect for states' rights
will be maintained, but the individual will also be protected from "great
and immediate irreparable harm." When no state criminal prosecution is
pending the balance is struck differently: a state's right to be free from
federal interference is considered secondary to the federal courts' duty to
protect individuals from unconstitutional laws. But even in that instance,
the balance is not struck totally in favor of the individual - the rights of
states are protected by the constitutional prohibition against issuance of
advisory opinions. Left undecided was how the balance should be struck
when the state action was civil as opposed to criminal. Also unanswered
was the question of when a state court action is pending for nonintervention purposes. The following discussion will examine what the Court
did during its 1974 Term and thus reveal the answers to these questions.
IV.
A.

THE

1974

TERM

Huffman v. Pursue: Nonintervention and the Quasi-CriminalCase

In Mitchum"v. Foster,13' the Court successfully avoided deciding the
issue of the applicability of Younger nonintervention to noncriminal
U.S. at 188. The Court stated:
Inasmuch as Doe and her class are recognized, the question whether the other appellants - physicians, nurses, clergymen, social workers, and corporations - present
a justiciable controversy and have standing is perhaps a matter of no great consequence. We conclude, however, that the physician-appellants, who are Georgialicensed doctors consulted by pregnant women, also present a justiciable controversy and do have standing despite the fact that the record does not disclose that
any one of them has been prosecuted, or threatened with prosecution, for violation
of the State's abortion statutes. . . . The physician-appellants, therefore, assert a
a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment. They should not be required to
await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.
131407 U.S. 225 (1972).
130410

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss1/6

24

ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

1976]

cases. 32 In its first encounter with the nonintervention doctrine during
the 1974 Term, the Court was forced to face this issue head-on.
Plaintiff in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. 33 was the lessee of the Cinema I
Theatre in Lima, Ohio. Plaintiff's predecessor, William Dakota, had specialized in showing allegedly pornographic films. Defendants in Huffman, the sheriff and prosecuting attorney of Allen County, Ohio, had enforced Ohio's public nuisance statute 134 against the Cinema I Theatre
while it was under the management of Dakota. The Court of Common
Pleas of Allen County reviewed a number of films which had been shown
at the theater and ruled that Dakota had engaged in displaying obscene
movies. Pursuant to the nuisance statute the theater was closed for a
year, unless released sooner by order of the court. 135 Prior to the judgment, Huffman, the current plaintiff, succeeded to Dakota's leasehold, but
rather than appeal the state court's judgment, he filed a complaint in
federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief that the state
statute was unconstitutional. The district court did not consider the applicability of Younger nonintervention and instead declared the statute
unconstitutional insofar as it prevented the showing of films not judged
obscene and enjoined that portion of the state court judgment closing
the theater. Defendants appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The majority of the Court began by considering the applicability of
Younger nonintervention to "quasi-criminal" cases. They pointed out
that the Court in Younger had justified nonintervention on two grounds:
first, the doctrine that a court of equity should not proceed when a plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, particularly when asked to intervene
in a criminal prosecution, and second, the "more vital consideration" of
comity or a "proper respect for state functions."' 136 Based mainly on
this second "more vital" consideration, the Court found Younger nonintervention fully applicable to the present case. It also found the first
consideration applicable because the state proceeding was "akin to a
criminal prosecution," but their main reliance was clearly placed on the
37
concept of comity.
The Court in Huffman diluted the vitality of Mitchum v. Foster in
132 See

text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.

1-420 U.S. 592 (1975).
114Omo REV. CODE ArN. § 3767.01 (Page 1971).
135420 U.S. at 598. The statute provided that upon satisfaction of certain conditions
including a showing that the nuisance would not be reestablished, a release from the
closure order could be obtained. Otuo REv. CODE ANN. § 3767.04 (Page 1971).
136420 U.S. at 601, quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
137
420 U.S. at 599-601. The Court stated:
The component of Younger which rests upon the threat to our federal system is
thus applicable to a civil proceeding such as this quite as much as it is to a criminal
proceeding. Younger, however, also rests upon the traditional reluctance of courts
of equity, even within a unitary system, to interfere with a criminal prosecution.
Strictly speaking, this element of Younger is not available to mandate federal restraint in civil cases. But whatever may be the weight attached to this factor in
civil litigation involving private parties, we deal here with a state proceeding which
in important respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil
cases.
Id. at 604.
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which the requested injunction operated against a "quasi-criminal" state
proceeding. Although the Anti-Injunction Act would not preclude an injunction, at least in the absence of great and immediate irreparable harm,
Younger would.1 3 8 In light of the Court's main reliance on comity, rather
than the traditional reluctance of a court of equity to restrain criminal
proceedings, it is difficult to perceive why this argument would not apply
full force against intervention in purely civil cases.1 39 The three Justices
141
40
who dissented in Huffman,1 and at least one member of the majority,
saw the Court's opinion as the first step toward applying Younger nonintervention to all state court proceedings. When this is accomplished,
to nothing
the "landmark case" of Mitchum v. Foster will have eroded
142
in the absence of great and immediate irreparable harm.
Having found Younger fully applicable to "quasi-criminal" cases, the
Court turned to plaintifFs contention that since the trial court had reached
a final judgment which was not appealed, there was no pending state
proceeding. This argument was rejected. The prospect of a federal court
138

See text accompanying note 114 supra. As the Supreme Court recently stated:

So strongly has Congress weighted this factor of federalism in the case of a state
criminal proceeding that it has enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2283 to actually deny to the
District Courts the authority to issue injunctions against such proceedings unless
the proceedings come with narrowly specified exceptions. Even though an action
brought under § 1983, as this was, is within those exceptions, Mitchum v. Foster,
. . . the under-lying notions of federalism which Congress has recognized in dealing with the relationships between federal and state courts still have weight.
Where an .injunction against a criminal proceeding is sought under § 1983, "the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism" must nonetheless restrain a federal
court.
Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S.Ct. 598, 608 (1976) (citations omitted).
139The Court's recent decision in Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976), applying
the concept of "comity" to forbid a federal court's interference in the operations of a city
police force, further indicates that Younger will apply full force to purely civil cases. The
Court in Rizzo stated:
But even where the prayer for injunctive relief does not seek to enjoin the state
criminal proceedings themselves, we have held that the principles of equity
nonetheless militate heavily against the grant of an injunction except in the most
extraordinary circumstances. In O'Shea v. Littleton. . . . we held that "a major
continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into the daily
conduct of state criminal proceedings is in sharp conflict with the principles of
equitable restraint which this Court has recognized in the decisions previously
noted." And the same principles of federalism may prevent the injunction by a
federal court of a state civil proceeding once begun ...
• . .Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important part in
governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments, though
initially expounded and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in cases where it
was sought to enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have not been limited
either to that situation or indeed to a criminal proceeding itself. We think these
principles likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is sought not against
the judicial branch of the state government, but against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local governments such as respondents here.
Id. at 608 (citations omitted).
140420 U.S. at 613 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ.).
141 See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 357 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
As pointed out by Mr. Justice
142 See text accompanying notes 104-14 supra.
Rehnquist, even prior to the Huffman decision, some lower federal courts were applying
Younger nonintervention to purely civil state proceedings. 420 U.S. at 607. See Duke v.
Texas, 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1973); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973);
Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1972).
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overturning the final judgment of a state court was held to be an even
greater insult to the abilities of state judges to carry out their sworn duty
to uphold the Constitution." 3
The significance of Huffman lies in its holding that state remedies
must necessarily be exhausted when Younger applies,' 44 that Younger is
fully applicable to "quasi-criminal" cases, and in its suggestion of applicability to purely civil cases.

B.

MTM Inc. v. Baxley: Nonintervention and the
Three-Judge District Court

The next opinion of the 1974 Term, MTM Inc. v. Baxley,'4 5 did not
rest squarely on Younger grounds but did greatly affect this area. The
facts in MTM were almost identical to those in Huffnan. A theater
owner whose establishment was closed under a state nuisance statute
requested a federal district court to enjoin the state court proceeding.
In this case, though, the district court refused to issue the injunction and
dismissed on Younger grounds. 46 Because this was a decision of a threejudge district court,'147 plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The Court noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument. 48
When the case was heard, the Court vacated the lower court judgment
and remanded in a per curiam decision.
Plaintiff in MTM argued that because of the requested injunction the
case was one required to be heard by a three-judge court and was, under
section 1253, directly appealable to the Supreme Court.149 The Court
rejected plaintiff's argument holding that the dismissal on Younger principles was not a resolution of the merits of the constitutional claim and
that direct appeal would lie only after such a resolution. 50 The case was
remanded with instructions to appeal to the court of appeals.
14 420 U.S. at 608-09. This point raises an interesting situation. The Court considered
it a great insult to a state judge for a federal court to intervene and overturn his decision
prior to appeal. It would appear to be an even greater insult to allow a case to go through
the entire appellate process of the state only to have the United States Supreme Court
reverse. Of course, the assumption is that the state appellate courts will correct any errors
which the state trial court made. In those situations where the appellate courts fail to do so,
however, the Supreme Court not only insults the abilities of the trial judge, but also those
of the appellate judges. In the meantime the federal plaintiff has been denied his constitutional rights.
144 A recent commentator addressed this aspect of the Huffman decision, Comment,
Federal Equitable Restraint: A Younger Analysis in New Settings, 35 MD. L. REV. 483,
497-511 (1976). It is important to realize that Huffman's requirement of exhaustion of
state remedies only applies in cases in which the federal plaintiff is directly attacking the
past prosecution, and not to cases like Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975), in which the
past prosecution was used only in an effort to enjoin future prosecutions.
See text
accompanying notes 153-64 infra.
145420 U.S. 799 (1975) (per curiam).
146 General Corp. v. Sweeton, 365 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (three-judge court).
147 Of the major cases under discussion, those that were not appealed from decisions of
three-judge district courts were: Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Ellis v.
Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
'
415 U.S. 975 (1974).
9 See note 1 supra, for the text of § 1253.
150420

U.S. at 804.
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This decision has an unpleasant effect on a plaintiff in a federal case
to which Younger nonintervention applies, if, as thought by at least one
Justice,' 5 ' a three-judge district court must make the decision to apply
Younger. The plaintiff must first present his case to a three-judge district
court. If the three-judge court applies Younger and dismisses, he then
must appeal to the court of appeals. If the three-judge district court
finds Younger inapplicable or satisfied, the defendant may appeal
directly to the Supreme Court. It is unclear what will happen if either
the Supreme Court in the latter situation, or the appeals court in the
former, finds that 5 2the three-judge district court erred in its decision of
the Younger issue.1
C.

Ellis v. Dyson: Nonintervention and Loitering in Dallas

The Supreme Court was next confronted with nonintervention 1in54
Ellis v. Dyson.' sa Plaintiffs in Ellis, like plaintiff in Golden v. Zwickler,
had been prosecuted under the law being challenged. Plaintiffs were
arrested at two a.m. on January 18, 1972 in Dallas, Texas and charged
with violating the city's loitering ordinance. 5 5 At their trial in Dallas
Municipal Court, plaintiffs moved to have the case dismissed on the
ground that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
56
Upon denial of this motion, they entered pleas of nolo contendere1
and were fined ten dollars plus costs. They chose to forego filing the
requisite fifty dollar bond and obtaining a trial de novo in county court.
If they had pursued the trial de novo the amount of the fine, upon a judgment of guilty, might have been increased to a maximum of two hunThere, Mr. Justice Brennan
'"' Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 457 n.7 (1974).
writing for the majority stated:
Since the complaint had originally sought to enjoin enforcement of the state statute
on grounds of unconstitutionality, a three-judge 'district court should have been
A three-judge court is required even' if the constitutional attack convened ....
as here - is upon the statute as applied . . . and is normally required even if the
decision is to dismiss under Younger-Samuels principles, since an exercise of discretion will usually be necessary....
152 Mr. Justice Douglas suggested an answer to this predicament in his dissent:
Perhaps the three-judge court system, along with direct review here, should be
eliminated or altered in a major way....
420 U.S. at 809. Perhaps serious consideration should be given to A.L.I. Proposal § 1374
which would greatly modify the three-judge court. Regardless of the ultimate solution,
the present requirement that this type of case be heard by a three-judge court, and if relief
is denied, then appealed to a three-judge appeals court, is a thorn in the side of a Younger
plaintiff and an unnecessary waste of judicial time.
1- 421 U.S. 426 (1975). Actually, there was a case in the interim, Kugler v. Helfant,
421 U.S. 117 (1975). In Kugler, a pure Younger situation, the Court refused to enjoin a
state prosecution, even though the plaintiff alleged and sought to prove great and immediate
irreparable harm, thus demonstrating the difficulty involved in overcoming Younger.
' 394 U.S. 103 (1969). See text accompanying notes 55-62 supra.
55421 U.S. at 427-28.
The legal effect of such a plea shall be the same as
156 A plea of nolo contendere.
that of a plea of guilty, but the plea may not be used against the defendant as an
admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the
criminal prosecution is based.
TEX. CODE CPuM. Pno. ANN. art. 27.02 (1966), as amended, TEX. CODE CmuM. PRO. ANN. art.
27.02(5) (1975), quoted at 421 U.S. at 428-29 n.3.
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dred dollars. They then filed suit in federal district court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional because
it proscribed "conduct that may not be limited," and impermissibly
chilled "the right of free speech, association, assembly, and moverent."'15 7 They also sought expungement of their arrest records, but did
not seek to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. The district court dismissed based on its analysis that Younger principles applied when prose15
cution was threatened as well as when it was actually pending. 8
The court of appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certio159
rari.
The Supreme Court began by pointing out that the case had proceeded
through the lower courts before the decision in Stejfel 60 which held that
Younger did not apply to a requested declaratory judgment by a plaintiff
presenting a justiciable controversy in the absence of a pending state
prosecution. The Court treated this as such a case rather than an attempted collaterial attack on a state prosecution. It did find it necessary, however, to caution the lower court on how to proceed on remand,
expressing reservations about the existence of a case or controversy because plaintiffs' attorneys had not been in contact with their clients for
approximately one year and thus were not sure that plaintiffs still were
in Dallas. If plaintiffs were in fact no longer in Dallas, it would be impossible to find a threat of future prosecution under the challenged ordi16 1
nance.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Powell made clear his view that
even if the plaintiffs were still found to be in Dallas, the likelihood of
further prosecution under the challenged statute was so remote that the
case conclusively lacked justiciability. He did emphasize, however,
that
[p]etitioners' previous arrests and convictions are relevant to the
justiciability of their prayer for prospective relief only if they evidence a realistic likelihood that petitioners may be arrested
16 2
again.
Mr. Justice White, in a separate opinion,'6 concurred in the reversal
of the court of appeals' decision, but dissented from the failure to rule on
117421 U.S.

at 431.
Ellis v. Dyson, 358 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
159Ellis v. Dyson, 475 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 416 U.S. 954 (1974).
160Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 431 (1975).
161421 U.S. at 434. The Court there stated:
It is appropriate to observe in passing, however, that we possess greater reservations here than we did in Steffel as to whether a case or controversy exists today.
First, at oral argument counsel for petitioners acknowledged that they had not
been in touch with their clients for approximately a year and were unaware of their
clients' whereabouts. . . . Unless petitioners have been found by the time the
District Court considers this case on remand, it is highly doubtful that a case or controversy could be held to exist. . . . Further, if petitioners no longer frequent
Dallas, it is most unlikely that a genuine threat of prosecution for possible future
violations of the Dallas ordinance could be established.
102421 U.S. at 445 (Powell, J., dissenting).
163421 U.S. at 437 (White, J., concurring).
's

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976

29

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:75

the issue of expungement of the records. He considered this portion of
plaintiffs' prayer as setting forth a case or controversy, and would have
dismissed under Younger because to do otherwise would, in his opinion,
have been a violation of Huffman's rule which required the exhaustion
of state remedies before a federal court could intervene. What Mr.
Justice White failed to realize, however, was that plaintiff's requested
expungement was preconditioned on the Court favorably ruling on the
declaratory judgment and for this reason the Court was correct in not
ruling on the second request until the first was disposed of on the merits.
This case rounds out the holding in Golden v. Zwickler. Not only
may a person prosecuted under an allegedly unconstitutional statute and
found not guilty challenge said statute, but a plaintiff found guilty may
also challenge it. This conclusion is, of course, based on the premise
that the challenge looks only to future enforcement of the statute and
that the plaintiff, unlike Zwickler and probably those in Ellis, is able to
present a justiciable controversy based on the likelihood of future en6 4
forcement of the statute.
D.

Hicks v. Miranda: Destruction of the "Primary Reliances"'65

The Court's five-to-four decision in Hicks v. Miranda'6 6 is perhaps
its most interesting decision dealing with this area of the law. It evoked
an impassioned dissent by Mr. Justice Stewart, who had previously joined
with the majority on Younger issues. More importantly, it established
the arrival of adolescence for Younger nonintervention and afforded the
opportunity to finally realize the full meaning of Dombrowski v.
Pfister.'7
Hicks presents one of the most complicated fact patterns of those cases
under discussion. Plaintiffs owned and operated the Pussycat Theatre in
Buena Park, California. On four different occasions police seized four
copies of the film "Deep Throat" from the theater. Subsequently, a
criminal misdemeanor charge based on the seized films was filed in
164 It is unclear, in light of Ellis, why Dr. Hallford was dismissed as a plaintiff in Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 126 (1973).

See text accompanying note 129 supra. Dr. Hallford
tried to distinguish his standing as a present defendant and a future possible defendant,
but the Court found no merit in such a distinction. Possibly the difference between Dr.
Hallford's situation and the instant one is that his case had not yet proceeded to a final
judgment, whereas the present case had because of plaintiffs' failure to appeal their pleas
of nolo contendere.
165 Mr.

Justice Stewart, dissenting in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), stated:
The Court today, however, goes much further than simply recognizing the right of
the State to proceed with the orderly administration of its criminal law; it ousts the
federal courts from their historic role as the "primary reliances" for vindicating
constitutional freedoms.
Id. at 356, quoting F. FRANKFURTER & J. LAmrs, Tim BUSINEsS OF THE SuPREME COURT 65
(1972), where it was stated:
In the Act of March 3, 1875, Congress gave the federal courts the vast range of
power which had lain dormant in the Constitution since 1789. These courts
ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing between citizens of different states
and became the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by
the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.
'
422 U.S. 332 (1975).
'
380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Orange County Municipal Court against two employees of the theater,
but no charges were lodged against plaintiffs. On the same day, however,
the Superior Court of Orange County ordered plaintiffs, in an action in
which they were named defendants, to show cause why the films should
not be declared obscene. Plaintiffs appeared, objected to the court's
jurisdiction on state law grounds, and said they were reserving all federal
questions.'6
The superior court subsequently viewed the film, declared it obscene, and ordered all copies at the theater seized. This
order was not appealed.
Plaintiffs then filed an action in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the California obscenity statute 16 9 was unconstitutional, an injunction against enforcement of the statute, and an injunction ordering the return of the seized films. The district judge refused a
requested temporary restraining order because of a lack of irreparable
injury and an insufficient likelihood of prevailing on the merits. He
further requested the convening of a three-judge court to consider the
constitutionality of the statute. Service of the complaint in the threejudge district court was completed on January 14, 1974. On January
15, 1974, the criminal complaint in Municipal Court was amended, naming the federal plaintiffs as defendants. On June 4, 1974, the threejudge district court declared the obscenity statute unconstitutional and
ordered all copies of "Deep Throat"' returned to plaintiffs.170 The Su17
preme Court, after deciding the appeal was correctly before them '
turned to the issue of Younger nonintervention and held that the district
court should have dismissed under Younger.
In reversing the lower court decision, the Supreme Court did not rely
on either the superior court proceedings, where the federal plaintiffs had
been named defendants, or the fact that plaintiffs' interests were "intertwined" with those of their employees' who had been named defendants in the separate state criminal action.' 72 The Court, instead,
emphasized that the plaintiffs had been named defendants in the municipal court action the day after their filing of the federal complaint. It
was noted that no previous case had drawn the line at the day the federal complaint was filed:
Indeed, the issue has been left open; and we now hold that where
state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court,
the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force.' 73
161 422 U.S. at 335. Plaintiffs' action in attempting to "reserve" their federal questions
apparently stemmed from the old problem of confusing nonintervention with Pullman
abstention. When a federal plaintiff is sent to state court to litigate his state question under
Pullman, he reserves his federal questions for presentation to the federal court after completion of the state litigation.
"9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West 1970).
"T0Miranda v. Hicks, 388 F. Supp. 350 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (three-judge court).
171 422
172

U.S. at 344-48.
Id. at 348.

173

Id. at 349 (footnote omitted).
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The Court went on to find an absence of the requisite great and immediate irreparable harm and reversed.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the four dissenters, accused the
majority of distorting the Younger doctrine's accommodation of competing interests. He argued that the Court's rule, allowing a state prosecutor
to frustrate the plaintiff's federal case by beginning a state prosecution
after the filing of the federal complaint, ousted "the federal courts from
their historic role as the 'primary reliances' for vindicating constitutional
freedoms."' 1 74 But Mr. Justice Stewart was wrong in his accusations
that the Court in Hicks accomplished any such ouster. If the federal
courts were ever ousted from their historic role, that ouster took place
ten years prior to the Hicks decision in Dombrowski v. Pfister.
Reexamining the facts of Dombrowski 75 one will discover that at the
time the complaint was filed in federal court there were no proceedings
pending in state court. This was pointed out by Mr. Justice Brennan to
show that the Anti-Injunction Act was inapplicable. After the federal
complaint was filed a grand jury was impaneled in anticipation of indictments of the federal court plaintiffs. The Supreme Court found that enforcement of the statute could be enjoined, not because of the absence of
a state prosecution,'7 6 but because of the presence of great and immediate
irreparable harm based on the finding of harassment on the part of
state officials. 1 77 In fact, Mr. Justice Stewart concurring in Younger
pointed out that the course to be followed in the absence of a state
prosecution was an open question. 78 How could this have been an
open question if it had been settled in Dombrowski? When, in Steffel v.
Thompson,'7 9 the Court finally decided what course to pursue absent a
state prosecution, it found no need to overcome Dombrowski. If Dombrowski had been a case without a pending state prosecution, the plaintiff in Steffel would have had to show great and immediate irreparable
harm to receive a declaratory judgment, a showing which was not required by the Court. 8 0 Hicks, then, did not enlarge the Dombrowski
holding in the least. In fact, it did not go to the extreme allowed by
Dombrowski. In Hicks the federal plaintiffs had nonintervention applied
to them because they were named defendants in state court; in Dombrow174Id. at 356 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).

175See text accompanying notes 17-23 supra.
176The Court did note the absence of a state prosecution for purposes of § 2283, see

text accompanying note 23 supra. But their very treatment of the nonintervention issue
implied the presence of a prosecution for nonintervention purposes. It may be suggested
that this reading of the case is incorrect and that it actually answered the question, still
considered open, of how a court should handle a request for an injunction in the absence
of a prosecution. See text accompanying note 194 infra. This cannot be a correct analysis,
however, because the plaintiffs in Dombrowski requested a delcaratory judgment as well
as an injunction. Zwickler v. Koota established that when such a request for both forms of
relief is made, the declaratory judgment issue must be decided independently from the injunction issue. See text accompanying note 39 supra. The only time the two issues are
the same is when a state prosecution is pending. See text accompanying notes 83-89 supra.
177 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
See text accompanying note 81 supra.
178 401 U.S. at 54-55 (Stewart, J., concurring).
179415 U.S. 452 (1974).
ISSee text accompanying note 124 supra.
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ski, the only action which 81had taken place on the state level was the
impaneling of a grand jury.
Mr. Justice Stewart did make one valid criticism of the Court's
opinion:
There is the additional difficulty that the precise meaning of the
rule the Court adopts is a good deal less than apparent. What
are "proceedings of substance on the merits?" Presumably, ' the
2
proceedings must be both "on the merits" and "of substance.' 1
Although the Court was unclear about when it became too late for a state
to commence a state court action, it is possible to gain some insight from
a prior opinion of one of Mr. Justice Stewart's fellow dissenters. In his
separate opinion in Perez v. Ledesma,'8 3 Mr. Justice Brennan found that
Younger principles should not apply to a requested declaratory judgment
when state court proceedings, pending at the time the federal complaint
was filed, were no longer pending when the case came up for hearing
before the three-judge district court. He there stated: "The availability
of declaratory relief was correctly regarded to depend upon the situation at the time of the hearing and not upon the situation when the federal suit was initiated.' 8 4 The majority of the Court did not reach this
issue in Perez, but Mr. Justice Brennan's logic seems convincing. Part of
the justification for nonintervention has been that a federal plaintiff can
raise his constitutional objection in defense of his state court action.
The opportunity to raise that issue is not diminished by the fact that the
state action began after the federal complaint was filed. If, as Mr.
Justice Stewart feared,8 5 the state prosecutor were to initiate a state
action for the sole purpose of keeping a plaintiff out of federal court
and with no hope of gaining a conviction, it would appear that the plaintiff would be able to overcome the applicability of Younger because the
state suit would have been brought for purposes other than securing a
conviction. 86 As Mr. Justice Stewart suggested, taken alone, Hicks
does appear to "trivalize" Steffel or, at least to restrict it.' 8 7 But Hicks
was not destined to be the Court's last encounter with this area of the
law during the 1974 Term.
E.

Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.: DeclaratoryRelief
and PreliminaryInjunctions

In the Supreme Court's last 1974 Term encounter with Younger
nonintervention, it did much to counteract the feared opportunity given
181See text accompanying note 20 supra.

112422 U.S. at 353 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
183401 U.S. 82 (1971).

114Id. at 103 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
185 422 U.S. at 357.

I86 Such a prosecution could hardly be called a good-faith prosecution, and the injury
to the federal plaintiff would not be that "incidental to every criminal proceeding brought
" Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965),
lawfully and in good faith ..
quoting Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943).
187 422 U.S. at 353.
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state prosecutors by Hicks. The facts in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.' 88 follow a familiar pattern. Plaintiffs in Doran were the operators of three
bars which featured topless dancers. On July 17, 1973, the town of North
Hampstead, where the bars were located, passed an ordinance prohibiting
topless dancing.1 89 Plaintiffs complied with the ordinance, but on August 9, 1973, filed an action in federal court seeking a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a declaratory judgment that the
ordinance was unconstitutional. The requested temporary restraining
order was denied. The next day one of the three plaintiffs, M & L Restaurant, Inc., again started providing topless dancers. M & L, as a result, was
served with criminal summonses based on the challenged ordinance.
The other two plaintiffs did not resume presenting topless dancers until
after the district court issued a preliminary injunction.
The district court refused to dismiss under Younger principles because
the prosecution pending against one plaintiff did not affect the other two,
and because it would have been "anomalous"'190 not to extend federal
relief to M & L as well. The district court entered an opinion and order
granting a preliminary injunction "pending the final determination of this
action."' 9" In support of the injunction the district court found that the
ordinance was unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed 92 and
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
After overcoming an initial jurisdictional issue, 93 the Court, in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, determined that it was error for the
district court not to dismiss M & L as plaintiff because of the state proceeding pending against it. This showed the vitality of the Hicks rule
for otherwise a federal plaintiff, after the filing of his federal complaint,
could flaunt the state law with no fear of prosecution.
The Court next turned to the preliminary injunctions issued in favor
of the other two plaintiffs.
Whether injunctions of future criminal prosecution are governed
by Younger standards is a question which we reserved in both
Steffel . . . and Younger. . . . We now hold that on the facts of
this case the issuance of a preliminary injunction is not subject
194
to the restrictions of Younger.
This holding, when considered along with Hicks, achieved the balance
between competing interests which the Court had long struggled to obtain. Hicks established that a state can proceed against an individual
even after the filing of a federal complaint. If this rule were not followed,
the federal plaintiff could disobey the challenged state law without fear
of it being enforced against him after the filing of his federal complaint.
188

422 U.S. 922 (1975).

189Id.

at 924.

19' Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 364 F. Supp. 478, 481-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
191364 F. Supp. at 483.
192Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1974).
193

194

422 U.S. at 927.
Id. at 930.
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On the other hand, Doran provided protection for the federal plaintiff
by permitting the issuance of a preliminary injunction upon satisfying
the traditional equity requirements of immediate irreparable harm and a
likelihood of succeeding on the merits. 195 Because of the requirement of
a likelihood of success on the merits, the Doran rule prevents the federal
plaintiff from receiving a preliminary injunction to avoid prosecution
under a law which is in fact constitutional, but allows him to avoid a
prosecution under an unconstitutional law without having to refrain from
protected activities.
CONCLUSION

After the long journey from Dombrowski in 1965, the doctrine of
Younger nonintervention has finally reached adulthood. The Court has
provided a solid rule to be followed in the varied situations which arise
in this area. The proper balance has now been struck, allowing a plaintiff to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional state statute without undergoing the unpleasant risk of a criminal prosecution, but also protecting
the rights of states to be free from federal interference with the goodfaith administration of their laws. A plaintiff who wishes to challenge a
state statute, whether criminal or civil, will fall into one of two categories:
Either he will be involved in a state court proceeding under the challenged
state statute or he will not. This proceeding can exist at a very early
stage, such as the impaneling of a grand jury. The time to determine the
existence of such a proceeding is not when the federal complaint is filed,
but rather when it comes up for hearing.
If the plaintiff falls into the second category he should attempt to
obtain a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction when
he files his complaint to avoid being forced into the first category. He
should also carefully allege a current threat of enforcement that will continue throughout the controversy. By so doing he presents a justiciable
controversy and thus avoids the fate suffered in the past by most federal
plaintiffs who were not being prosecuted. The allegations can be based
on oral threats of prosecution, or simply the sheer likelihood that certain activity will result in prosecution. The likelihood of the plaintiff's
being prosecuted will be increased by the presence of a past but final
prosecution.
If the plaintiff falls into the first category, that is, if he is involved in a
state prosecution, he must allege and prove that without the assistance of
the federal court he will suffer great and immediate irreparable harm.
This harm must be shown by the presence of harassment on the part of
the prosecuting authorities. But the plaintiff who falls into the first category should keep in mind that, in the ten years since the formulation of the
test in Dombrowski, only one set of plaintiffs, those in Dombrowski, have
satisfied its test.
CLAIR

E.

DICKINSON

191 See W. DE FXJNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQury 16-17 (1956).
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